Trust in government and fiscal adjustments : [Version 4 June 2013] by Bursian, Dirk et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dirk Bursian - Alfons J. Weichenrieder - Jochen Zimmer 
 
 
 
 
Trust in Government and Fiscal 
Adjustments 
 
 
 
SAFE Working Paper Series No. 22 
  
 
 
 
Non-Technical Summary 
 
In recent economic research, the amount of trust in society has been identified as an 
important factor that benefits economic performance and growth. It is not only private 
agents who may benefit from being trusted but also governments. Trust in government 
may allow more delegation of political decisions and may make redundant tight decision 
rules that, while serving as a potentially helpful commitment, can produce a cost due to 
the inflexibility that they introduce.  
 
The paper starts from the presumption that trust should play a prominent role also in the 
context of fiscal policy. Fiscal reputation and trust in the prudence of the political process 
may give a government important leeway when reacting to fiscal shocks. While a 
government that lacks trust may find itself pressed to firmly react to a shock in the debt 
level by increasing taxes and reducing expenditures, a highly trusted government can 
possibly defer fiscal corrections to a later period when the macroeconomic situation is 
more suitable and the cost of austerity is less severe. This intuition is born out in a stylized 
model of fiscal policy where the government is assumed to minimize a loss function.  
 
Using the model as a starting point, the paper moves on to study the relation between 
citizens’ trust in the national government (as documented in Eurobarometer surveys) on 
the one hand and observed fiscal behavior on the other hand by estimating fiscal reaction 
functions for panels of EU countries. Our findings support the idea that the level of trust in 
government has implications for fiscal policy and more specifically for the development of 
primary budget deficits. Our findings are compatible with the view that a high level of 
trust increases the leeway of governments and allows more expansionary policies during 
periods when the economy is weak. As in previous estimates of fiscal reaction functions, 
we find that the higher the debt level, the higher is the targeted primary surplus of a 
country. At the same time, we find evidence that a high level of trust leads to smaller 
fiscal corrections in times when growth is low. 
 
A recent literature looks at differences of business cycles across countries and finds that 
well governed countries tend to have less pronounced fluctuations. The present paper may 
be seen in connection to this observation as it highlights a possible transmission channel. 
Good governance and high trust in government seem to allow for fiscal policies that are 
more counter-cyclical and lead to less fiscal corrections in times when growth is low.  1 
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Abstract 
The paper looks at the determinants of fiscal adjustments as reflected in the primary surplus of 
countries. Our conjecture is that governments will usually find it more attractive to pursue 
fiscal adjustments in a situation of relatively high growth, but based on a simple stylized 
model of government behavior the expectation is that mainly high trust governments will be 
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1  Introduction 
  When it comes to the private exchange of goods and services, trust in cooperative 
behavior by trading partners can reduce transaction costs and increase the benefits of 
comparative advantage. In recent economic research, the amount of trust in society has been 
identified as an important factor that benefits economic performance and growth (see, for 
instance, Zak and Knack, 1999, and Knack and Keefer, 1997).  
  It is not only private agents who may benefit from being trusted but also governments. 
Trust in government may allow more delegation of political decisions and may make 
redundant tight decision rules that, while serving as a potentially helpful commitment, can 
produce a cost due to the inflexibility that they introduce. A frequently used example of how 
trust can increase flexibility is the ‘only Nixon could go to China’ phenomenon. Public trust 
in the conservative political ideals of Nixon allowed him a pragmatic approach towards a 
communist country that would not have been possible for a liberal president.  
  While reciprocal trust is an active area of research (see, for instance, Sapienza and 
Zingales, 2011, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002, and La Porta et al., 1997), it seems that less 
research has been done to assess the role of trust in government or political institutions. Of 
course some exceptions apply. The concept of trust has recently received attention in the 
literature on tax evasion (Feld and Frey, 2002). Perhaps more prominently, Kydland and 
Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), and Rogoff (1985) emphasize that a high level of 
credibility and reputation, concepts which are inherently related to trust, increases the 
efficiency of policy actions in the context of monetary policy. In this respect, Bursian and 
Fürth (2012) are among the first to examine individual as well as macroeconomic factors that 
influence trust in the European Central Bank using micro data. Furthermore, Bursian and Faia 
(2013) use microfoundations of trust and implement trust in the monetary authority into a 
dynamic macro model. 
  As in the area of monetary policy, we expect trust to play a prominent role also in the 
context of fiscal policy. Fiscal reputation and trust in the prudence of the political process 3 
 
may give a government important leeway when reacting to fiscal shocks. While a government 
that lacks trust may find itself pressed to firmly react to a shock in the debt level by increasing 
taxes and reducing expenditures, a highly trusted government can possibly defer fiscal 
corrections to a later period when the macroeconomic situation is more suitable and the cost 
of austerity is less severe. The ongoing debt crisis in European countries may come to mind, 
but recently such an argument has been made for the U.S. as well. In a Wall Street Journal 
article (Hilsenrath, 2013), the decline in trust has recently been named as a possible reason 
that prevented the U.S. government from pursuing stronger counter-cyclical measures during 
the financial crisis.  
  Trust also seems to be important when it comes to voters’ preferences towards fiscal 
policies. In a recent study using a large representative survey of German voters, Heinemann 
and Henninghausen (2012) find that respondents with a high level of trust have a stronger 
preference for low deficits than respondents with a low trust in government.  
  Motivated by these findings and conjectures, the present paper studies the relation 
between citizens’ trust in the national government on the one hand and observed fiscal 
behavior on the other hand. To do so we exploit data for the European Union (EU) covering 
the years 1999 to 2011. Since 1999, the Eurobarometer surveys conducted on behalf of the 
European Commission have a regular question on trust in public institutions, which allows the 
analysis of an extensive country panel. We use this information on general trust towards 
national governments by estimating fiscal reaction functions as presented, for instance, in 
Bohn (1998), and Mendoza and Ostry (2008). Our findings support the idea that the level of 
trust in government has implications for fiscal policy and more specifically for the 
development of primary budget deficits. Our findings are compatible with the view that a high 
level of trust increases the leeway of governments and allows more expansionary policies 
during periods when the economy is weak. As in previous estimates of fiscal reaction 
functions, we find that the higher the debt level, the higher is the targeted primary surplus of a 
country. At the same time, we find evidence that a high level of trust leads to smaller fiscal 
corrections in times when growth is low. 4 
 
The organization of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents a simple stylized model 
of trust and primary surpluses. Section 3 presents the data sources and descriptive statistics. 
Empirical results are discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes. 
2  A simple theoretical framework 
  Based on the simple arithmetic of the intertemporal budget constraint of the 
government, the inherited amount of public debt requires an equally large amount of 
discounted primary surpluses in the future.
 Therefore, an increase in the stock of debt due to 
some shock is expected to lead to an increased primary surplus. While a reaction is necessary 
to comply with the budget constraint, the exact timing may be debatable and the current 
macroeconomic situation may be crucial. Recent empirical research suggests that fiscal 
multipliers indeed are comparatively larger if the economy shows low utilization of resources 
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012a, 2012b). Increasing the primary surplus in times of 
fully-utilized capacity may therefore be less costly than pursuing a fiscal correction in times 
of a flat economy.  
  This idea may be spelled out by assuming that the government is minimizing a loss 
function L that has several components. The component      reflects the positive and convex 
cost of having a primary surplus p. This cost is increasing in   as governments are assumed to 
prefer spending over a strict consolidation policy. Since trust in government has been shown 
to be associated with voters’ preference for lower deficits (Heinemann and Henninghausen, 
2012) we weigh this cost component by the term  1     , where 0   1  is a measure of 
trust in government. As a consequence, other things equal, trusted governments have a higher 
concern for the future and hence a smaller preference for high deficits. Another consideration 
comes from the size of debt levels. High debt levels may make fiscal corrections inevitable so 
we assume a convex function     ·   that enters negatively in the loss function, where d 
captures the debt level which is non-negative by assumption. Hence, this sub-function   and 
the multiplicative interaction of   and   imply that a given primary surplus provides a larger 
benefit if the debt level is high as the need for a high primary surplus is more pressing. 5 
 
Finally, to capture the inconvenience of fiscal corrections in times of low capacity usage, i.e. a 
cyclical downturn, we add the convex cost    ·   , where   0  is a measure of the 
underutilization of production capacity. This cost component captures the idea that fiscal 
adjustments have different multiplier effects dependent on the state of the economy.  
  Taking together the three components of the imposed loss function, we have the 
function  
          1           ·        ·     (1) 
that the government aims to minimize. We assume that the debt levels and surpluses are 
normalized such that their values are positive throughout. Similar to loss functions that are 
usually assumed for monetary policy, we propose a quadratic form of the additive parts, 
which implies, together with the non-negativity assumptions of  , ,and  ,  
       ,    ·  ,    ·     0  
        ,     ·   ,     ·     0      (2) 
                   ·           ·     0 .  
From the first order condition of the government we have that  
 
    /           ·  1          ·    ·        ·    ·  0   . (3) 
Making use of the second order condition for a minimum (       ·  1 t         ·   ·     
     ·    ·     0 ), total differentiation of this first order condition implies that  
 
 
   
      0 .   (4) 
A higher level of debt implies an increase in the optimal level of the surplus. This is what we 
would also expect from an intertemporal budget constraint. From the first order condition (3) 
and assumption (2) we obtain  
 
 
  
    0 . (5) 6 
 
Hence, the desired magnitude of the primary surplus is smaller when capacities are weakly 
utilized. From taking the differential of (5) with respect to the debt level d we obtain 
 
 
   
       0 . (6) 
From (6) we find that the fiscal correction triggered by a change in debt will be smaller if 
capacities are underutilized, i.e. if g is larger. Finally, we find from taking the derivative of (6) 
with respect to t that  
 
 
   
          0 .   (7) 
 
From (7) we derive that a high trust government will in general have smaller fiscal reactions 
upon a shock in debt than a low trust government.  
  We may summarize our expectations from equations (4) to (7) in 
 
Proposition 1: (i) The higher the debt level, the higher is the targeted primary surplus. (ii) 
This primary surplus is smaller if macroeconomic capacities are underutilized. (iii) High trust 
governments react differently from low trust governments and have a smaller correction of 
the primary surplus upon a shock in the debt level when macroeconomic capacities are less 
than fully utilized.  
3  Data sources and descriptive statistics 
  Eurobarometer surveys, which are conducted on behalf of the European Commission, 
usually appear twice a year and cover all EU member countries. Among other things, the 
surveys ask participants about their trust in several institutions. One question is specifically on 
national governments as one of the institutions covered: 
 7 
 
“I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain 
institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend 
not to trust it. (READ OUT) The (NATIONALITY) Government” 
 
Survey participants are given the choice between three possible answers: “1, Tend to trust”, 
“2, Tend not to trust”, and “3, Do not know”. 
  The binary measure of trust is transformed into a continuous variable by calculating 
the fraction of respondents that tend to trust the government. We average the biannual data 
into yearly data to obtain an annual panel from 1999 to 2011. A detailed description of the 
data source can be found in the appendix. Figure 1 presents the mean response regarding trust 
in national governments from 1999 to 2011 for the EU and the euro area. The data shows a 
substantial variation of the average levels of trust over time. Table 1 contains the responses 
for all countries and available years and also illustrates the substantial variation across 
countries. In the starting year 1999, the lowest level of trust in national governments was 
recorded for Belgium (.251) and the highest level of trust for Luxembourg (.710). After 2008, 
the level of trust in national governments dropped substantially in many countries under 
consideration, with the lowest level (.09) reached in Latvia 2009.  
  An alternative potential measure of trust in government is the sovereign credit rating 
by international rating agencies. We prefer the survey based trust measure since country 
ratings are much more dependent on the level of government debt, a variable that we rather 
prefer to keep separate in the following empirical estimations.  
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Figure 1: Average EU/euro area citizens' trust in national governments 
 
Notes: The figure presents the average (unweighted) country levels of EU (dashed)/euro area (solid) citizens’ 
trust in national governments from 1999 to 2011. Countries are included in the average for a given year if in this 
year they were a member of the EU or the euro area, respectively. The data for 2000 corresponds to the average 
value of 1999 and 2001 as no survey data on trust in national governments is available for that year. 
 
 
Figure 2: Average EU/euro area primary surplus in percent of GDP 
 
Notes: The figure presents the average (unweighted) country levels of EU (dashed)/euro area (solid) primary 
surplus in percent of GDP from 1999 to 2011. Countries are included in the average for a given year if in this 
year they were a member of the EU or the euro area, respectively.  9 
 
 
  Our macroeconomic data includes information on total public debt and primary fiscal 
balances as shares of GDP, real GDP, and total government expenditures. The primary fiscal 
balances are calculated as the fiscal balance net of interest payments on public debt. We use 
data from the OECD’s Analytical Database on general government gross financial liabilities 
and the government deficit/surplus as a share of GDP as well as on real GDP at current prices 
and on total expenditure of general government. For the gross government interest payments, 
we use data from the OECD Economic Outlook database. Figures 2 and 3 present the EU/euro 
area average primary surplus and indebtedness in percent of GDP. While on average the euro 
area countries had higher primary surpluses, they also had a higher average indebtedness. 
  Prior to 2008, the average EU/euro area debt ratios show a stable or even declining 
trend and similar things may be said for primary surpluses. From 2009, we see a stark 
increase in debt levels and strongly reduced primary surpluses.  10 
 
Table 1: Average level of trust in national governments 
Year  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Austria  0.555 0.525 0.495 0.525 0.450 0.470 0.476 0.550 0.604 0.510 0.617 0.531 0.577 0.530 
Belgium  0.251 0.375 0.499 0.490 0.439 0.382 0.461 0.493 0.541 0.373 0.384 0.265 0.383 0.410 
Bulgaria                  0.224 0.178 0.290 0.428 0.373 0.298 
Cyprus            0.717 0.693 0.634 0.632 0.758 0.644 0.472 0.401 0.619 
Czech Republic            0.301 0.242 0.310 0.238 0.199 0.290 0.294 0.148 0.253 
Denmark  0.437  0.517  0.598  0.600  0.594 0.536 0.588 0.570 0.648 0.593 0.623 0.450 0.484 0.557 
Estonia            0.501 0.541 0.585 0.685 0.554 0.448 0.557 0.539 0.551 
Finland  0.612 0.605 0.599 0.587 0.597 0.650 0.666 0.652 0.685 0.642 0.576 0.500 0.605 0.613 
France  0.398 0.406 0.415 0.320 0.390 0.313 0.244 0.230 0.425 0.310 0.312 0.259 0.263 0.330 
Germany  0.463 0.466 0.469 0.415 0.299 0.279 0.272 0.322 0.445 0.394 0.450 0.318 0.371 0.382 
Greece  0.365 0.409 0.452 0.410 0.468 0.559 0.430 0.434 0.449 0.292 0.336 0.236 0.126 0.382 
Hungary            0.448 0.374 0.401 0.267 0.173 0.178 0.495 0.326 0.333 
Ireland  0.438 0.476 0.513 0.471 0.355 0.437 0.422 0.412 0.408 0.383 0.233 0.159 0.356 0.390 
Italy 0.316  0.358  0.400  0.385  0.344 0.303 0.328 0.360 0.341 0.227 0.299 0.266 0.203 0.318 
Latvia            0.288 0.354 0.302 0.205 0.175 0.090 0.170 0.175 0.220 
Lithuania            0.418 0.284 0.256 0.272 0.180 0.171 0.144 0.168 0.236 
Luxembourg 0.710  0.744  0.778  0.756 0.696 0.712 0.749 0.715 0.733 0.645 0.786 0.717 0.780 0.732 
Malta            0.549 0.504 0.494 0.553 0.588 0.493 0.403 0.428 0.501 
Netherlands 0.669  0.689  0.708  0.648 0.432 0.395 0.403 0.472 0.628 0.600 0.596 0.497 0.529 0.559 
Poland            0.136 0.139 0.204 0.197 0.247 0.230 0.312 0.312 0.222 
Portugal 0.651  0.589  0.527  0.517  0.442 0.327 0.350 0.364 0.399 0.339 0.339 0.202 0.230 0.406 
Romania                  0.217 0.265 0.281 0.125 0.120 0.202 
Slovakia            0.223 0.199 0.322 0.455 0.446 0.456 0.386 0.288 0.347 
Slovenia            0.408 0.410 0.417 0.362 0.360 0.377 0.233 0.132 0.337 
Spain 0.504  0.518  0.532  0.509  0.425 0.496 0.453 0.478 0.549 0.547 0.398 0.215 0.209 0.449 
Sweden  0.369 0.454 0.540 0.587 0.480 0.482 0.345 0.439 0.511 0.526 0.615 0.639 0.638 0.510 
United  Kingdom  0.442 0.418 0.395 0.360 0.299 0.272 0.347 0.290 0.334 0.281 0.245 0.295 0.280 0.328 
Total 0.479  0.503  0.528  0.505  0.447 0.424 0.411 0.428 0.445 0.399 0.398 0.354 0.350 0.436 
Notes: The table presents the average level of EU/euro area citizens’ trust in national governments from 1999 to 2011. Countries are included in the average for a given year if 
in this year they were a member of the EU. The values for 2000 correspond to the average value of 1999 and 2001 as no survey data on trust in national governments is 
available for that year. 11 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Average EU/euro area indebtedness in percent of GDP 
 
Notes: The figure presents the (unweighted) average EU (dashed)/euro area (solid) indebtedness as a fraction of 
GDP from 1999 to 2011. Countries are included in the average for a given year if in this year they were a 
member of the EU or the euro area, respectively. 
 
 
4  Empirical implementation and results 
We examine whether differences in the level of trust in the fiscal authority within EU 
and euro area countries are associated with different fiscal reactions to changes in debt. We do 
so by estimating a cross-country panel version of Bohn’s (1998) “model-based sustainability 
approach” (MBSA). The MBSA analyzes how the primary deficit reacts to variations in the 
public debt caused by economic shocks. From the intertemporal budget constraint of the 
government an increase in the stock of debt must be accompanied with an increase of the 
discounted value of future primary surpluses. Although there is no necessity to react to a 
shock in debt right away, the observation of a positive immediate reaction is a sign that the 12 
 
government is respecting its intertemporal budget constraint.
1 In the simplest and most 
common version, the MBSA assumes a linear connection between the inherited debt level and 
the primary surplus of period t 
  t t t d s      1 ,                                                                                (8) 
where  t s  is the primary surplus as a fraction of GDP in period t,  1  t d  is the initial debt level 
relative to GDP,   is an estimable coefficient, and  t   represents factors other than the debt 
level relative to GDP which influence the primary surplus. Based on our expectations of how 
trust in government influences fiscal policy, we estimate a refined cross-country panel version 
of the MBSA:  
    ,        ,          ,          _    ,        ,          _    ,              ,         ,      , .     (9) 
 
  ,  represents the primary surplus of country i in year t,    _  ,  is the percentage 
deviation of output from its trend value
2, and    ,  represents an error term with mean zero.   ,  
is a vector of control variables that includes    _  ,  (without interactions) and a measure of 
the deviation of government expenditure from its trend (    , ) as it is usually done in the 
associated literature (Bohn, 1998; Mendoza and Ostry, 2008) in order to capture shocks to 
countries’ expenditure needs. Owing to the inclusion of various interaction terms,   ,  also 
includes separate elements of the interaction terms (   _  , ,      _  ,              ,    ,  
   ,            ,    ,     and       ,   ) to ensure interpretability of the estimated 
coefficients. 
                                                 
1 In contrast to earlier sustainability tests (see, for instance, Wilcox, 1989, Kremers, 1989, Haug, 1990, Hakkio 
and Rush, 1991, or Trehan and Walsh, 1991), the MBSA does not require assumptions about the appropriate 
discount factor. In addition, the MBSA lacks information requirements on debt structure or the design of fiscal 
policy. 
2 A Hodrick-Prescott filter with a standard annual smoothing parameter of λ=100 has been applied. 13 
 
The results of our empirical model allow for a direct comparison with the predictions 
of the theoretical expectations spelled out in Proposition 1. The coefficients of particular 
interest are     and   . When interpreting the results, keep in mind that the variable    _ , 
which measures the relative deviation of output from the relevant country trend, is inversely 
related to the underutilization of production capacities as captured by the variable g in 
section 2.  The  coefficient     tends to indicate whether the primary surplus reacts 
systematically to variations in the lagged debt to GDP ratio. From the requirements of the 
intertemporal budget constraint, we should expect a positive correlation between debt and 
primary surpluses. However, the overall effect of debt works not only through   , but also 
through the interaction terms that include our debt measure. We expect that the extent to 
which high debt levels lead to increases in primary surpluses will depend on the 
macroeconomic situation. In general, consolidation, i.e. a high primary surplus, should be 
more palatable in years with fast growth, while years with mediocre growth performance will 
tempt governments to postpone consolidation and to wait for a more suitable time. At the 
same time, only high trust governments may be able to do so, while low trust governments 
may feel obliged to consolidate irrespective of the macroeconomic situation. To capture this 
idea of different reactions econometrically, we include the interaction term   ,           _    ,  
twice: the first time in a simple way, the second time the interaction term is additionally 
interacted with our variable of trust. Hence,   ,           _    ,  will capture the behavior of a 
(hypothetical) government with zero trust, while the interaction   ,           _    ,              ,    
takes up the differential effect for governments with higher trust levels. If higher trust 
governments can afford to condition consolidation on macroeconomic suitability, we should 
expect a positive coefficient for interaction   ,           _    ,              ,    , i.e.    > 0. 
Conversely,      may then be thought of as measuring the reaction of a country with zero trust 
which captures a hypothetical case as no country in our sample has a trust level of zero.  
  , the coefficient of our three-way interaction term, is our main coefficient of interest, 
indicating whether governments enjoying a higher level of trust react differently from low 14 
 
trust governments, e.g. showing less consolidation in adverse macroeconomic situations and 
more in good times.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Full sample (EU) 
Variable  Observ.  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
      ,   269 0.421  0.158  0.090  0.786 
  ,   269  0.009  0.063 -0.280 0.264 
  ,   269 0.593  0.309  0.061  1.700 
   _   ,   269  -0.001 0.048 -0.183 0.250 
    ,   269  0.000  0.019 -0.054 0.161 
Non-crisis sample (EU) 
Variable  Observ.  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
      ,   189 0.443  0.148  0.136  0.778 
  ,   189  0.023  0.055 -0.060 0.249 
  ,   189 0.568  0.298  0.061  1.257 
   _   ,   189  0.010  0.051 -0.183 0.250 
    ,   189  -0.004 0.015 -0.054 0.044 
Full sample (euro area) 
Variable  Observ.  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
      ,   158 0.452  0.149  0.126  0.786 
  ,   158  0.018  0.076 -0.280 0.264 
  ,   158 0.701  0.319  0.061  1.700 
   _   ,   158  0.000  0.034 -0.133 0.133 
    ,   158  0.001  0.021 -0.054 0.161 
Non-crisis sample (euro area) 
Variable  Observ.  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
      ,   111 0.477  0.134  0.227  0.778 
  ,   111  0.034  0.065 -0.060 0.249 
  ,   111 0.666  0.311  0.061  1.257 
   _   ,   111  0.008  0.033 -0.108 0.133 
    ,   111  -0.004 0.016 -0.054 0.044 
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the macroeconomic variables and the average level of trust in 
national governments for the EU and the euro area. The non-crisis sample covers the years 1999 to 2008, while 
the full sample covers the years 1999 to 2011.    _  is measured as percentages of the trend figures,     in 
terms of GDP to account for country size heterogeneity. The shape of the unbalanced panel is determined by the 
data availability as indicated in Table 1.  
An endogeneity problem may arise as high primary surpluses may increase trust. 
Therefore, we estimate equation (9) using lagged values of governments’ level of trust.
3 
                                                 
3 Since Eurobarometer surveys related to trust in government are unavailable before 1999, lagged values imply 
somewhat smaller samples than those described in table 2.  15 
 
Table 2 contains the summary statistics. It corresponds to our regressions below by 
looking at the EU and euro area sample of countries and the years 1999-2011 and 1999-2008 
separately. As is visible from figure 3, the development of debt was different in the subgroup 
of euro area countries and also the severity of the debt crisis may have been different. 
Therefore, table 3 reports four regressions using data samples that differ in two dimensions. 
Columns (A) and (B) use all EU countries, while columns (C) and (D) are based on euro area 
countries only. Columns (A) and (C) are based on years 1999-2011, while columns (B) and 
(D) exclude the crisis years 2009-2011.  
 
Table 3: Fiscal reaction functions with lagged levels of government trust  
Variables  Dependent Variable: Primary Surplus/GDP 
 
(A) 
 EU,  
1999-2011 
(B) 
EU, 
 1999-2008 
(C) 
 Euro area,  
1999-2011  
(D) 
Euro area,  
1999-2008 
  :   ,     0.035 0.122 ** 0.085 *  0.125 * 
 (0.87) (2.31) (1.67) (1.91)
  :   ,           _    ,    -0.377 -1.400 *** -1.232 *  -1.415 * 
 (-1.23) (-2.87) (-1.85) (-1.97)
  :   ,           _    ,              ,     1.444 3.008 *** 3.037 **  3.699 ** 
      (1.54) (2.85) (2.07) (2.44)
  :    _  ,   0.350 *** 0.350 *** 1.466 **  0.327
 (3.17) (3.00) (2.42) (0.91)
  :    _  ,              ,     -1.170 *** -1.188 *** -3.218 *** -1.534 *** 
     (-3.41) (-3.57) (-3.80) (-2.89)
  :   ,                ,     -0.040 -0.149 ** -0.003 -0.030
                       (-0.59) (-1.99) (-0.02) (-0.36)
  :       ,     0.057 0.096 * 0.054 0.047
 (1.40) (1.79) (0.62) (0.62)
  :     ,   -1.107 *** -0.762 *** -1.182 *** -0.968 *** 
 (-7.16) (-6.14) (-7.36) (-5.91)
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.91  0.94 0.94 0.96 
Observations 242  162  142  96 
Notes: Results are from OLS regressions with country and time fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.     _  and     are calculated from the cyclical components of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
   _  is measured as percentages of the trend figures,     in terms of GDP to account for country size 
heterogeneity.   
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In general, exclusion of the crisis years results in a better fit. For countries that comply 
with the intertemporal budget constraint we should expect a positive reaction of the primary 
surplus upon an increase in debt. The overall marginal effect of   ,     is predicted to be 
positive by Proposition 1 (i). However, it is insufficient to look at the coefficient    as   ,    
appears in several interaction terms. If calculated accordingly, the marginal effect is positive 
for the four regressions (0.020; 0.052; 0.086; 0.114) and significantly so in the case of 
samples (C) and (D). We also find that    is positive, which indicates in line with Proposition 
1 (ii) that primary surpluses are higher in years of above average growth, although the 
coefficient is insignificant in sample (D).  
In all four regressions, our main coefficient of interest (  ) shows the expected 
positive sign which supports our hypothesis that trust in government helps a country to 
smooth consolidation efforts such that more of it happens in economic revivals (Proposition 1 
(iii)). It is significant at the 1 or 5 percent levels in columns (B) – (D) and insignificant in 
column (A). To make sure that the results are not derived from an omission of variables that 
appear in interactions, we included the variables    _  , ,     _  ,              ,    ,     ,     
       ,  1,    and       ,  1. The deviation of expenditures from the country trend has the 
expected negative impact on primary surplus in all equations.   
The level of trust determined via surveys has been found to be strongly correlated with 
GDP growth (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011). This may raise the concern that our results are 
based on a spurious correlation. In order to remove the cyclical behavior in our trust variable, 
we try two different specifications. In a first modification we use the country specific average 
level of trust in national governments. Hence, this alternative trust variable                  shows 
variation across but not within countries and cannot be included along with country fixed 
effects; therefore the trust variable is only included in interaction terms. Table 4 presents the 
results derived from this time invariant trust measure. Again, we report on four different 
samples. Unlike in table 3, the new specification shows higher significance levels of 
coefficients for the longer samples in columns (A) and (C). Our main coefficient of interest 
(  ) is again always positive. It is statistically significant at the one percent level in (A) and 17 
 
(C), but insignificant in the shorter samples. Compared to table 3, the use of a country 
invariant trust measure tends to preserve the signs of the other covariates.  
 
Table 4: Fiscal reaction functions with country averages of government trust 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Primary Surplus/GDP 
 
(A) 
 EU,  
1999-2011 
(B) 
EU, 
 1999-2008 
(C) 
 Euro area,  
1999-2011  
(D) 
Euro area,  
1999-2008 
  :   ,     -0.103 0.325 ** -0.152 0.335
 (-1.12) (2.28) (-0.99) (1.48)
  :   ,           _     ,    -1.288 *** -0.817 -2.190 *** -0.764
 (-2.92) (-1.50) (-3.19) (-0.84)
  :   ,           _     ,                        3.687 *** 1.714 5.801 *** 1.782  
      (3.28) (1.43) (3.60) (0.95)
  :    _   ,   0.314 *** 0.204 **  0.969 *  0.295
 (3.03) (2.19) (1.72) (0.93)
  :    _   ,                        -1.124 *** -0.719 *** -2.671 *** -1.194 ** 
     (-3.31) (-2.70) (-3.47) (-2.12)
  :    ,                          0.295 -0.622 ** 0.549 -0.593
                       (1.38) (-2.09) (1.42) (-1.19)
  :                 
 
  :     ,   -1.071 *** -0.618 *** -1.270 *** -0.753 *** 
 (-5.24) (-6.44)   (-5.70) (-4.57)
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.90 0.95  0.93  0.96 
Observations 269  189  158  111 
Notes: Results are from OLS regressions with country and time fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are based 
on standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively.    _  and     are calculated from the cyclical components of the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter.    _  is measured as percentages of the trend figures,     in terms of GDP to account for country size 
heterogeneity. The variable         is dropped due to its time invariance and inclusion of country fixed effects.  
 
 
Another robustness check is based on the classification of countries into two groups: 
high trust or low trust countries. When a country has an average level of trust that is smaller 
than or equal to the respective EU or euro area average, the country is classified as being a 
low trust country and as a high trust country otherwise. Therefore, the trust variable is 
transformed into a dummy variable that may reduce measurement problems when comparing 
EU countries. For high trust countries the variable       
  is encoded as a one. Results are 
found in table 5. Again we use an interaction term to find that high trust countries are less 18 
 
responsive to debt shocks compared to low trust countries if growth is low. The relevant 
coefficient is significantly positive in three out of the four samples used.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Fiscal reaction functions with two trust groups 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Primary Surplus/GDP 
  
(A) 
 EU,  
1999-2011 
(B) 
EU, 
 1999-2008 
(C) 
 Euro area,  
1999-2011  
(D) 
Euro area,  
1999-2008 
  :   ,     0.036 -0.034 0.133 * 0.103
  (0.87) (-1.01) (1.92) (1.59)
  :   ,           _     ,    0.769 *** 0.009 2.138 ***  1.313 *** 
  (2.61) (0.07) (4.52) (4.10)
  :   ,           _     ,              
   0.795 ** -0.114 2.129 *** 1.335 *** 
      (2.58) (-0.56) (4.11) (4.04)
  :    _   ,   -0.275 *** -0.129 **  -0.968 ***  -0.641 *** 
  (-2.68) (-2.22) (-4.56) (-4.89)
  :    _   ,              
   -0.280 *** -0.073 -0.891 ***  -0.409 *** 
     (-2.59) (-1.18) (-2.82) (-2.82)
  :   ,                
   0.028 -0.196 *** 0.080 -0.003
                       (0.45) (-2.74) (1.07) (-0.05)
  :       
  
 
  :     ,   -0.989 ***  -0.610 *** -1.296 *** -0.798 *** 
  (-4.66)  (-5.27) (-5.57)   (-5.02)  
Country Fixed Effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.90 0.94  0.93  0.97 
Observations 269  189  158  111 
Notes: Results are from OLS regressions with country and time fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are based 
on standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively.    _  and     are calculated from the cyclical components of the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter.    _  is measured as percentages of the trend figures,     in terms of GDP to account for country size 
heterogeneity. The variable       
  is dropped due to its time invariance and inclusion of country fixed effects.     
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5  Conclusion 
  The European debt crisis has triggered a renewed interest in the possible 
contractionary effects of fiscal consolidation and many recent papers empirically discuss this 
issue. The present paper looks at a related issue by asking about the determinants of fiscal 
consolidation efforts as reflected in the primary surplus of countries. Our conjecture is that 
governments will usually find it more attractive to consolidate in a situation of relatively high 
growth, but based on a simple stylized model of government behavior the expectation is that 
mainly high trust governments will be in a position to defer consolidation to a period with 
higher growth. Overall, evidence on European countries provides support for this expectation. 
Fiscal reaction functions of high and low trust governments seem to differ in this respect.  
  A recent literature looks at differences of business cycles across countries and finds 
that well governed countries tend to have less pronounced fluctuations (Altug and Canova, 
2012). The present paper may be seen in connection to this observation as it highlights a 
possible transmission channel. Good governance and high trust in government seem to allow 
for fiscal policies that are more counter-cyclical and lead to less fiscal corrections in times 
when growth is low.  
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Appendix 
We combine a selected set of 24 Eurobarometer surveys which include our main variable of 
interest “Trust in the National Government”. The surveys are conducted on a semi-annual 
basis and are obtained from the “GESIS-Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences” in Cologne, 
Germany.  
 
Table 6: Eurobarometer surveys used 
Study Number  Title  Year    Version 
ZA 5567  Eurobarometer 76.3  2011    1.0.0, 17.09.2012, doi:10.4232/1.11448 
ZA 5481  Eurobarometer 75.3  2011    1.0.0, 01.09.2012, doi:10.4232/1.10768 
ZA 5449  Eurobarometer 74.2  2010    1.1.0, 08.06.2011, doi:10.4232/1.10707 
ZA 5234  Eurobarometer 73.4  2010    1.0.0, 23.11.2010, doi:10.4232/1.10197 
ZA 4994  Eurobarometer 72.4  2009    3.0.0, 03.02.2012, doi:10.4232/1.11141 
ZA 4973  Eurobarometer 71.3  2009    3.0.0, 03.02.2012, doi:10.4232/1.11135 
ZA 4819  Eurobarometer 70.1  2008    3.0.1, 17.11.2010, doi:10.4232/1.10193 
ZA 4744  Eurobarometer 69.2  2008    4.0.0, 18.10.2011, doi:10.4232/1.10992 
ZA 4565  Eurobarometer 68.1  2007    4.0.0, 09.09.2010, doi:10.4232/1.10126 
ZA 4530  Eurobarometer 67.2  2007    2.0.0, 18.12.2009, doi:10.4232/1.10068 
ZA 4526  Eurobarometer 66.1  2006    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4526 
ZA 4506  Eurobarometer 65.2  2006    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4506 
ZA 4414  Eurobarometer 64.2  2005    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4414 
ZA 4411  Eurobarometer 63.4  2005    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4411 
ZA 4229  Eurobarometer 62.0  2004    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4229 
ZA 4056  Eurobarometer 61.0  2004    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4056 
ZA 3938  Eurobarometer 60.1  2003    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3938 
ZA 3904  Eurobarometer 59.1  2003    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3904 
ZA 3693  Eurobarometer 58.1  2002    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3693 
ZA 3639  Eurobarometer 57.1  2002    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3639 
ZA 3627  Eurobarometer 56.2  2001    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3627 
ZA 3507  Eurobarometer 55.1  2001    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3507 
ZA 3204  Eurobarometer 52.0  1999    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3204 
ZA 3171  Eurobarometer 51.0  1999    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3171 
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